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1 Introduction
European Commission set the year 2006 as the European year of workers mobility. Even
though currently workersmobility within Europe is not substantially it is expected
to gain importance in the years to come. Indeed, politicians are pushing it through
as they think that "job mobility is one of the crucial factors in Europes economic
success" (pidla, 2006). Moreover, younger people are the most mobile with 5% of the
age groups 25-34 having moved at least once across EU countries. Finally, the 2004
EU enlargement allowed migration of more mobile citizens with 5% of the 2004 new
member states individuals expecting to move to another EU country in the next ve
years (Vandenbrande et al., 2006).
Mobility across di¤erent countries a¤ects the coexistence of di¤erent social insurance
systems. As a matter of fact, one nds in Europe countries whose welfare system is more
in the tradition of Beveridge (based on universal at benets) and others whose system
is mainly Bismarkian (based on benets related to past contributions). Since social
contributions are related to individual incomes, the more Beveridgean welfare systems
have a higher implicit income redistribution. Consequently, mobility raises concerns
about the sustainability of the most generous and redistributive systems. The reason
is that it can be expected that the most generous and redistributive systems, when
facing mobility, will attract the lowest incomes and the highest risks and will repeal the
highest incomes and the lowest risks (Sinn, 1990). Therefore, redistribution and the size
of benets would be substantially decreased.
The aim of this project is precisely to conclude about the sustainability of more
redistributive insurance systems in a context of labor mobility. The novelty of our
approach is twofold. First, we introduce migration costs in the analysis in view of
getting more realistic interior solutions. While this assumption is commonly used in a
tax competition setting (Hindriks, 1999 and Leite-Monteiro, 1997) to our knowledge it
hasnt yet been used in a social competition setting. Second, we will consider a strategic
interaction between governments in setting the type, i.e., Beveridge versus Bismark, and
the level of social insurance benets, i.e., the generosity of the system. We will contrast
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the equilibrium arising from if both governments have concerns for redistribution and
insurance, if both countries have concerns for insurance only, and if one government has
concerns for redistribution and insurance while the other only cares for insurance.
The issue of tax competition in a context of factors mobility has already been widely
studied (see Cremer and Pestieau (2004) for a survey). However much needs to be
assessed in what concerns social insurance competition. There are mainly two papers
closely related to our project. Cremer and Pestieau (1998) study the strategic interaction
between benevolent social planners in a two-country setting. They suppose a three-stage
decision process where in the rst stage, the constitutional stage, social planners decide
the degree of redistribution of social insurance (the Bismarkian factor). At the second
stage native individuals decide through majority voting on the level of payroll taxes, i.e.,
the level of benets. At the third stage individuals decide upon migration. They get the
result that if rich are mobile they end up all living in the same country. This implies
that one of the countries would insure but not redistribute. Another result is that, when
countries adopt the same level of redistribution, the level of benets is greater the less
redistributive (less Bismarkian) is the social insurance system. Finally, at stage one
the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., the planners choose the same level of redistribution.
Consequently, all countries would end up with the same Bismarkian factor in contrast
to what we observe in reality. Still, that is not what is observed in reality. For this
reason in a following paper, Cremer and Pestieau (2003) have analyzed social insurance
competition between Bismarkian and Beveridgean systems. Decisions are taken in two
stages: the benevolent social planner decides upon the level of benets, anticipating
the migration ows of the second stage. They get the result that all poor may end up
migrating towards the Bismarkian country. In both Cremer and Pestieau (1998, 2003)
papers bang-bang solutions with all poor/rich migrating towards the same country is
due to the absence of migration costs.
Other authors have as well contributed to the literature on social insurance in a
context of labour mobility. As Cremer and Pestieau (2003), Lejour and Verbon (1994)
also get the result that the impact of economic integration on social insurance depends
very much on the type of mobility assumed. However, they have assumed high-risk and
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low-risk individuals rather then high income and low income individuals. Bureau and
Richard (1997) get an analogous result.1
In the present paper we consider a two country setting where individuals are endowed
with either low or high income and face the risk of loosing it. They are born in one of the
countries and can decide their country of residence. Although they have a preference for
living in their home country (Leite-Monteiro, 1997 and Hindriks, 1999). This preference
for the home country enables to get rid o¤ the bang bang solutions, present for example
in Cremer and Pestieau (1998, 2003). The social planner aims at maximizing the welfare
of its natives (in contrast of its residents).
The timing of decisions is as follows. The type of social insurance benets is, at
rst, given and governments implement either a Bismarkian or a Beveridgean social
insurance policy. At a rst stage of interaction, governments choose noncooperatively
the level of payroll taxes, i.e., the size of the system. Knowing the type and size of
the system, individuals decide about their country of residence. Governments care
for their natives only and when setting the payroll tax they anticipate the migration
equilibrium. We will consider three scenarios: one in which both countries adopt a
Beveridgean social policy, another in which both adopt a Bismarkian one, and nally
one in which one country adopt a Beveridgean and the other a Bismarkian policy. An
important contribution of the present paper is that we justify the adoption of di¤erent
types of system by considering di¤erent types of governmentspreferences. Therefore
we allow for governments to care for redistribution and insurance or insurance only.
Finally, given governmentspreferences we illustrate the role of a strategic choice of the
type of the system.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and in
Section 3 we characterize the governmentschoices under autarky; it constitutes thus
our benchmark. In Section 4.1 we characterize the tax competition among Bismarkian
governments, in Section 4.2 between Beveridgean governments and in Section 4.3 we
1Another line of research has dealt with the e¤ect of social insurance incentives on human capital
investment. Poutvaara (2007) gets the result that labor mobility increases investments in human capital
in the Beveridgean country but reduces that of migrants from Bismarkian towards the Beveridgean
country.
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consider the third possibility in which one government implements a Beveridgean policy
and the other a Bismarkian one. In Section 5 we provide numerical examples for our
theoretical results. Section 6 considers the strategical choice of the type of system.
Finally, Section
2 Setup
There are two countries, indexed by A and B. Individuals di¤er in their wage, wi, with
i = L;H and wL < wH . Labor supply is inelastic and normalized at one so that wi also
represents exogenous income. The size of high-income (also referred to as rich) and
low-income (also referred to as poor) populations are each set at one. Individuals also
di¤er with respect to their preference for living in a country. Their taste is captured by
the parameter x 2 [0; 1] (Monsoorian and Myers, 1993, and Hindriks, 1999), uniformly
distributed over [0; 1] for both high- and low-income individuals. Preferences of an
individual i, who lives in country A or B are respectively dened by
UAi = ln

wAi

+ 1  x (1)
UBi = ln

wBi

+ x; (2)
where wji , is the individuals disposable income when residing in country j = A;B.
Country As natives are individuals with a taste parameter x  1=2 and country Bs
natives those with a taste parameter x > 1=2. Consequently both countries have a
native population of 1, equally composed of low- and high-income individuals.
<FIGURE 1 about here>
For the ease of exposition we suppose for the time being that only low-income
individuals face the risk to loose their income, with a probability of 1=2. In Section 5 we
shall relax this assumption and consider that all individuals face the risk to loose their
income. National governments provide social insurance which gives poor individuals
a benet in the bad state of nature (when they loose their earning ability). Social
insurance is nanced by taxes, with the tax base depending on the type of system.
When the system is Bismarckian there is no redistribution and benets to the low-
income individuals are nanced by taxes levied on low-income individuals. Under a
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Beveridgean system, on the other hand, the benets to the low income individuals are
nanced by a proportional tax levied on both income classes at a uniform rate.
We assume, for the time being, that the system which is adopted and the prefer-
ences of the respective government go hand in hand. In other words, a Bismarckian
government implements a Bismarckian system, while a Beveridgean government selects
a Beveridgean system. Governments are labeled according to their preferences, which
may or may not reect a concern for redistribution.2
We adopt a specication of social welfare which explicitly distinguishes between re-
distribution across income classes and the provision of insurance (which can be thought
about as redistribution between states of nature). To do so, dene the certainty equiv-
alent of a low-income individual, CEjL; who lives in country j = A;B, as
ln
h
CEjL
i
=
1
2
ln
h
wL(1  tjL)
i
+
1
2
ln

bj

CEjL =

wL(1  tjL)bj
1=2
; (3)
where tjL is the tax rate for low income individuals in country j, and b
j the benet they
receive in case of income loss. High income individuals do not face any uncertainty, and
their certainty equivalent is simply given by
CEjH = wH(1  tjH); (4)
where tjH is the tax rate applied to rich individuals in country j. For simplicity, we
concentrate at this point on the case when no migration occurs, so that there is no
need to distinguish between residents and natives. Preferences of country As and Bs
governments are respectively given by
SWFA =
Z 1=2
0
(CEAL )
1 A   1
1  A +
(CEAH)
1 A   1
1  A + 2
Z 1=2
0
(1  x) dx (5)
SWFB =
Z 1
1=2
(CEBL )
1 B   1
1  B +
(CEBH)
1 B   1
1  B dx+ 2
Z 1
1=2
x dx; (6)
where j  0 represents the governments preference for redistribution. When j = 0,
redistribution across income groups does not provide any social benets (while insur-
ance does). At the other extreme, j ! 1 yields a Rawlsian social welfare function.
2This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.
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The last term on the RHS of both expressions accounts for low and high income indi-
vidualsutility for living in the home country. We consider two specications of social
preferences. The rst assumes j = 0 and reects the absence of income redistribution
concerns characteristic of Bismarckian countries. The second assumes j = 1, reecting
some income redistribution concern characteristic of Beveridgean countries (and being
conveniently simplied to logarithmic). To sum up government As preferences are given
by either of the following two expressions
SWFA =
Z 1=2
0
ln(CEAL ) + ln(CE
A
H)dx+ 2
Z 1=2
0
(1  x) dx, if A = 1 (7)
SWFA =
Z 1=2
0
(CEAL   1) + (CEAH   1)dx+ 2
Z 1=2
0
(1  x) dx; if A = 0 (8)
with analogous expressions applying for government B.3 Observe that expression (7) can
also be interpreted as a simple utilitarian welfare function (sum of individual utilities)
dened without the detour of certainty equivalents. When mobility and the possibility of
tax competition are introduced, three di¤erent cases of can arise: (i) Both countries have
Bismarckian type of preferences (insurance concerns only, with A = 0, and B = 0);
(ii) Both countries have Beveridgean type of preferences (insurance and redistribution
concerns, with A = 1, and B = 1); and (iii) Government A has Beveridgean type of
preferences while Planner B has Bismarckian ones (A = 1 and B = 0).
3 Autarky
To have a benchmark we rst look at the optimal choices of Bismarckian and Bev-
eridgean governments when migration is not possible. We adopt the perspective of
country A, but similar results are easily obtained for country B.
In the case of a Bismarckian system, the poor individuals insure among themselves
while rich individuals do not contribute (tAH = 0). This means that the only implicit
redistribution is within the class of low income individuals, from those in the good state
of nature (no income loss) towards those in the bad one (income loss). With a loss
3Both of these expression are valide under autharky; they may have to be amended once mobility is
introduced.
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probability of 1=2 budget-balancing benets are given by
bA = wLt
A
L : (9)
Substituting (9) into (3) and simplifying yields
CEAL = wL(1  tAL)tAL ;
while tAH = 0 implies CE
A
H = wH . Substituting into (8) and rearranging we obtain
SWFA =
1
2
[wL(1  tAL)tAL + wH ] + 2
Z 0:5
0
(1  x) dx: (10)
Maximizing this expression with respect to tAL
tBISL =
1
2
: (11)
This result does not come as a surprise: under autarky, the Bismarckian planner provides
full insurance at the actuarially fair price.4
Turning to the Beveridgean government, it provides insurance to the low income
individuals nanced by a tax levied on both income classes at a uniform rate tAL = t
A
H =
tA. The governments budget constraint requires
1
4
bA =
1
4
wLt
A +
1
2
wHt
A;
so that benets are given by
bA = (wL + 2wH) t
A:
Using this condition along with equation (7) the Beveridgean governments welfare
function can be rewritten as
SWFA =
1
2
ln

wL(1  tA)

+
1
2
ln

(wL + 2wH) t
A

+ln(wH(1 tA))dx+2
Z 1=2
0
(1 x) dx:
Maximizing this expression with respect to tA yields the solution t
BEV
= 1=4.
4This property holds for any (strictly) concave utility function (and not just the logarithmic speci-
cation).
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4 Migration of low income individuals
We now introduce the possibility of the poor migrating to the other country. The timing
is the following. At Stage 1 both governments simultaneously choose taxes. Then, at
Stage 2 low income individuals decide upon their country of residence. Finally, at Stage
3 the state of nature is realized for poor individuals (who may or may not loose their
earning ability).
We suppose that a countrys type of system (Beveridgean or Bismarckian) is given
and determined by its governments preferences. Low income individualsmigration ows
are dened with respect to native populations. Consequently, as long as there is some
migration ow, the low income resident populations di¤er from the native ones. This
a¤ects both the budget constraint and the welfare functions. Although governments
only care about their natives they supply social insurance to all their residents. On
the other hand, governments do care also for their natives who are living abroad and
subjected to other social insurance systems.
Let bxL denote the index of the marginal individual, who is indi¤erent between living
in country A or in country B. It is dened as solution to
1
2
ln

wL(1  tAL)

+
1
2
ln

bA

+ (1  bxL) = 1
2
ln

wL(1  tBL )

+
1
2
ln

bB

+ bxL; (12)
if such a solution exists. Poor individuals with a taste parameter lower than bxL decide
to live in country A. When (12) has no solution we set bxL = 1 when UAL > UBL for all
x and bxL = 0 in the opposite case. Throughout the paper we concentrate on the case
where bxL is interior. This is necessarily true in a symmetric equilibrium, but it may or
may not be true in asymmetric settings. Still, we focus precisely on interior solutions
as bang bang solutions, with all individuals migrating towards a same country, have
already been addressed in the literature (see for instances Cremer and Pestieau, 2003).
We now study how the possibility of migration a¤ects competition among di¤erent
types of insurance systems.
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4.1 Bismarck Bismarck tax competition
Recall that when migration is not possible, Bismarckian governments tax their low in-
come individuals at 1=2 providing them with full insurance. Under migration a govern-
ments policy choice a¤ects the residential decision of both countries natives. To study
a symmetric equilibrium we focus on country As perspective and assume without loss
of generality that bxL  1=2.5 The budget constraint is
1
2
bxLbA = 1
2
bxLtAL : (13)
As long as bxL > 0 this condition simplies to
bA = wLt
A
L ; (14)
which is exactly identical to (9), the Bismarckian budget constraint under autarky. This
does not come as a surprise. As low income residents insure among themselves (pay
an actuarially fair rate), migration does not a¤ect the budget constraint of the social
insurance system. Furthermore, for bxL > 1=2 government As welfare function continues
to be given by
SWFA =
Z 0:5
0
(CEAL   1) + (CEAH   1)dx+ 2
Z 0:5
0
(1  x) dx; (15)
which is the same as under autarky, because no native of country A has migrated
to the other country. Substituting for CEAL and CE
A
H from equations (3) and (4),
and using the budget constraint it is then plain that we return to equation (10), the
expression of welfare under autarky. Consequently we obtain the same solution, namely
tAL = t
B
L = t
BISBIS
L = 1=2, (where the subscript BISBIS stands for country As and
country Bs type of insurance policy, respectively, Bismarckian and Bismarckian). Since
tAL = t
B
L ; there is no migration in equilibrium (bxL = 1=2).
4.2 Beveridge Beveridge Tax Competition
We examine how migration a¤ects Beveridge Beveridge tax competition. Each govern-
ment charges the same tax rate to both resident income classes, so that tAL = t
A
H = t
A,
5To avoid a tedious exposition, and anticipating the migration ewuilibrium, we focus on bxL  1=2,
but the analogous exercise can be done to bxL < 1=2:
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and tBL = t
B
H = t
B. As before we focus on Planner A with bxL  1=2. In contrast to the
Bismarck-Bismarck competition case, migration now a¤ects the budget constraint
1
2
bxLbA = 1
2
bxLwLtA + 1
2
wHt
A; (16)
so that the level of benets are now given by
bA =

wL +
wHbxL

tA: (17)
Note surprisingly, for a given tax rate, the level of benet in country A decreases as
the size of the poor population increases (as bxL raises). Substituting (17) into (12), the
denition of bxL, yields
1
2
ln

wL(1  tA)

+
1
2
ln

wL +
wHbxL

tA

+ (1  bxL) =
1
2
ln

wL(1  tB)

+
1
2
ln

wL +
wH
1  bxL

tB

+ bxL: (18)
Totally di¤erentiating this expression and rearranging, we obtain
@bxL
@tA
=
1
2tA
  1
2(1 tA)
2 + wH
2

wL+
wH
1 bxL

(1 bxL)2 + wH2wL+wHbxL bx2L
; (19)
which is positive provided that tA < 1=2. In words, the size of the low income population
increases with the tax rate as long as the price of insurance is below the actuarial fair
price. Conversely, when a country cuts its tax rate, it will incite some of its poor
residents to move to the other country. For future reference, note that when tA = tB,
we have bxL = 1=2 and expression (19) simplies to
@bxL
@tA
=
1
2tA
  12(1 tA)
2 + 2wHwL+2wH
: (20)
Using the budget constraint, welfare of the Beveridgean government A (for bxL  1=2),
dened by equation (7), can be expressed as follows
SWFA =
1
4
ln

wL(1  tA)

+
1
4
ln

wL +
wHbxL(tA; tB)

tA

+
1
2
ln

wH(1  tA)

+ 2
0:5Z
0
(1  x)dx: (21)
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To understand this expression, recall that with bxL  1=2 all natives of country A live
in country A. The rst term on the RHS concerns the poor who do not experience an
income loss, while the second term accounts for the poor who su¤er an income loss (and
receive social benets). The third term represents the utility of consumption of the rich
whereas the last terms measures the utility from living in country A, derived through
the taste parameter x.
Di¤erentiating welfare with respect to tA yields the following FOC
FBEV BEV =
 3
4(1  tA) +
1
4tA
+
wH
4(wL +
wHbxL )
 @bxL=@tAbx2L = 0: (22)
Using (20), setting t = tA = tB and bxL = 1=2 and solving show that in a symmetric
equilibrium the tax rate is given by
tBEV BEV =
1
4

4wH + 2wL
5wH + 2wL

<
1
4
: (23)
To interpret this result, recall that the tax rate under autarky is equal to 1=4; see Section
3 . In the Beveridgean case, migration and the induced tax competition thus results in
a lower tax rate and a reduced level of social insurance. Not surprisingly, this result
obtains even when there is e¤ectively no migration in equilibrium, and it is in sharp
contrast to the outcome of Bismarckian systems.
Summing up our results for the symmetric cases, we show that tax competition
represents no threat to Bismarckian systems, while it leads to a lower (but positive)
level of social protection with Beveridgean systems. These results are quite in line
with conventional wisdom but they are of limited interest for practical policy issues
because they only concern symmetric settings. The most interesting issues arise for the
asymmetric cases to which we now turn.
4.3 Beveridge Bismarck Tax Competition
Suppose now that country A is Beveridgean while country B is Bismarckian. Benets in
country A continue to be given by equation (17) and those in country B are determined
by
bB = wLt
B
L ; (24)
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which is the counterpart to equation (14). The marginal individual, bxL, is then deter-
mined by the condition
1
2
ln

wL(1  tA)

+
1
2
ln

wL +
wHbxL

tA

+ (1  bxL) =
1
2
ln

wL(1  tB)

+
1
2
ln

wLt
B

+ bxL; (25)
stating that he enjoys the same level of utility in both countries.
Di¤erentiating this expression, we obtain
@bxL
@tA
=
1
tA
  1
(1 tA)
4 + wH
wL+
wHbxL
bx2L
: (26)
This equation shows that country As resident population continues to be increasing in
its own marginal tax rate (for tA < 1=2) like in the case where the competing country
was Beveridgean. Consequently, the direction of the migration response to a countrys
tax increase is independent of the other countrys type. However, its magnitude is larger
than under Beveridge-Beveridge competition. This property follows immediately from
the comparison of (26) with (20) which implies
@bxL
@tA
BEV BIS
>

@bxL
@tA
BEV BEV
: (27)
Let us now determine best replies of each of the countries concentrating on the case
where bxL  1=2, i.e., some of the poor from the Bismarckian country move to the
Beveridgean country. This is the case one would intuitively anticipate to occur and this
expectation is conrmed in the numerical examples reported below. To study govern-
ment Bs best response we now have to write its objective explicitly (a complication
we have been able to avoid in the symmetric cases above). The specication under
autarky, (6) with B = 0, is easily generalized to account for migration and bxL  1=2.
Rearranging and simplifying this yield
SWFB =
bxL   1
2

(CEAL   1) +
bxLZ
1=2
(1  x)dx+ (1  bxL)(CEBL   1) + 1ZbxL xdx
+
1
2
(CEBH   1) +
1Z
1=2
xdx: (28)
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The rst two terms on the RHS of this expression concerns those poor natives of B
which have moved to country A (i.e., poor individuals with taste parameters in the
range [1=2; bxL]), while the next two terms account for the poor who remain in their
native country B. Finally, there are the two terms representing the utility of the rich
(who do not move, incur no risk and pay no taxes). The derivative of this expression
with respect to the tax rate can be decomposed as follows:
@SWFB
@tB
=
@SWFB
@bxL @bxL@tB + (1  bxL)@CE
B
L
@tB
;
where we use the property that CEAL and CE
B
H do not depend on t
B. Observe that
equation (25) implies @SWFB=@bxL = 0; because bxL is by denition indi¤erent between
both countries of residence, a small change in this marginal individual has no rst-order
e¤ect on welfare. Consequently, the rst-order condition for tB reduces to
@CEBL
@tB
=
@wL(1  tBL )tBL
@tB
= 0; (29)
where we have used equations (3) and (24) to express CEBL as a function of t
B. Solving
yields tB = 1=2 irrespective of the tax of the other country. In other words, providing
full and actuarially fair insurance remains the dominant strategy of the Bismarckian
country and we have tB
BEVBIS
L = 1=2.
Turning to government A; it maximizes its natives expected utility according to
Beveridgean preferences. The problem (for bxL  1=2) is
SWFA =
1
4
ln

wL(1  tA)

+
1
4
ln

wL +
wHbxL(tA; tB)

tA

(30)
+
1
2
ln

wH(1  tA)

+ 2
0:5Z
0
(1  x)dx; (31)
and the FOC is given by
FBEV BIS =
 0:75
1  tA +
0:25
tA
+ 0:25
wH
wL +
wHbxL
 @bxL=@tAbx2L = 0: (32)
First-order conditions (22) and (32) are too complicated to permit a clear-cut compari-
son between country As tax rate under Beveridge-Beveridge and that under Beveridge-
Bismarck competition. With @bxL=@tA > 0, equation (27) then implies that for the same
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migration level bxL we have FBEV BIS < FBEV BEV . Consequently, for a given migration
equilibrium (bxL), government A sets a higher tax rate when it is competing with a Bis-
marckian country than when the other country is Beveridgean (tA
BEVBIS
> t
BEVBEV
, for
the same bxL). This result suggests that, surprisingly, the Beveridgean countrys social
insurance system could be more generous when it competes with a Bismarckian country
than with a Beveridgean country. Put di¤erently, the race-to-the-bottom a¤ecting tax
rates and level of social protection could be less intense under a Beveridge-Beveridge
competition than under a Beveridge-Bismarck competition.
Unfortunately the problem remains too complex to obtain analytical results beyond
this somewhat speculative argument, even with our logarithmic specication. The fol-
lowing two sections present numerical examples to illustrate the conclusions obtained
so far and to obtain some additional results.
5 Numerical examples
We now present numerical examples assuming fwL; wHg = f1; 2g. Columns 2 and
3 of Table 1 present the outcome for a Beveridgean and a Bismarckian country under
autarky. In accordance with the analytical results, the Beveridgean government imposes
a uniform tax rate of 1/4, while poor residents of a Bismarckian country face a tax rate
of 1/2. Observe that welfare levels among planners with di¤erent preferences are not
comparable.
Columns 46 present the results for the three types of tax competition when low
income individuals have the possibility to migrate. We can draw the following conclu-
sions. First, migration a¤ects Beveridgean insurance policies only ; Bismarckian coun-
tries keep o¤ering actuarially fair full insurance. Beveridgean countries, on the other
hand, are forced to reduce their marginal tax rates. Second, the Beveridgean tax is
greater when the other country is Bismarckian planner than when it is Beveridgean
(0:224 vs. 0:219). This numerical result conrms the conjecture expressed in the ana-
lytical part, that the race-to-the-bottom a¤ecting tax rates may be more important under
Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Third, a
more signicant tax-race-to-the-bottom is not necessarily bad news. The Beveridgean
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country attains a higher welfare under the Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under
Beveridge-Bismarck competition, even though the tax rate is lower. This is because
under Beveridge-Bismarck competition the cost of receiving migrants from country B
(poor individuals with a taste parameter x in the range [0:5; 0:74]) is not o¤set by
a slightly higher marginal tax rate. On the other hand, under Beveridge-Beveridge
competition, the symmetry of the problem ensures no migration ows in equilibrium.
Fourth, competition with a Beveridgean country may increase the welfare of a Bismar-
ckian country, even when the social insurance policy is unchanged. This is because the
low income migrants are better o¤ in the Beveridgean country A (recall that welfare
depends on the natives). All the other low-income individuals (x > 0:74) are as well o¤
as under autarky. They have the option to move to the other country but for them the
benet of a Beveridgean insurance policy does not o¤set the cost of migration (because
the high level of x represents a large degree of attachment to the home country).
So far we have concentrated on case where only the poor face and earnings risk and
are mobile. The last three columns of Table 1 present some results for the case where the
rich are mobile (while the earnings risk continues to be restricted to the poor). When
the high income individuals are mobile, the tax-race-to-the-bottom under Beveridge-
Beveridge competition is more signicant than when the poor are mobile. Consequently,
at the no migration equilibrium of the Beveridge-Beveridge competition low income
individuals are worse-o¤ and high income ones are better-o¤ (Column 4 and Column 7).
However, under Beveridge-Bismarck competition the mobility of high income individuals
generates a higher welfare for both income classes than the mobility of the poor (Column
6 and Column 9). The reason is that being low income individuals immobile, the natives
of the Bismarckian country cannot migrate towards the Beveridgean one, and, at the
same time, high income individuals natives of the Beveridgean country can migrate
towards the Bismarckian country and enjoy a higher utility.
Finally, let us consider the case where rich individuals also face an income risk that
may be insured by social insurance. Table 2 presents the results. We suppose that
all individuals may loose their entire income with probability 1=2 (the same for all).
The Beveridgean country taxes low and high income individuals at the same rate and
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provides a at benet to all individuals experiencing a loss. The Bismarckian planner
provides actuarially fair full insurance to each income class.
The results show that, with only one exception, there is no tax-race-to-the-bottom,
so that mobility has no impact on social insurance and welfare. The only exception
concerns the Beveridge-Bismarck tax competition. With low income individuals being
mobile, even thought taxes do not decrease, there is migration towards the Beveridgean
country. When instead high income are mobiles, the Beveridgean government is forced
to lower the tax from 0:5 to 0:445 to avoid a greater migration towards the Bismarckian
country. Nevertheless, the Beveridgean country attains its highest level of welfare when
it competes with a Bismarckian country and when high income individuals are mobile.
<Table 1 about here>
<Table 2 about here>
6 Choice of the system
Up to this point, we have assumed that preferences and type of system go hand in hand.
We shall now explicitly separate governments preferences from the type of system.
Under autarky, such a separation is of course not very relevant. When there is no
mobility it is plain that a Beveridgean government will prefer a Beveridgean social
insurance system over a Bismarckian one. Similarly, a Bismarckian government would
never opt for a Beveridgean system. When there is competition, the choice of the system
may in itself be part of a governments strategy. The question is if a government of a
given type may nd it benecial to adopt a system for the other type for strategic reasons
(i.e., considering the tax competition game to be played with the other country). Our
analysis is purely illustrative and we make use of a numerical example developed in the
previous section. Formally, We add a stage to the game where governments decide which
type of system to adopt. This decision is made (simultaneously) by both governments
before tax competition game considered in the previous section is played and there is
full commitment. We focus on the case where only the poor face an income risk and are
mobile. insurance and mobility of the poor only. Table 3 describes the three possible
games that may be played, depending on the type of governments. They can both have
17
Beveridgean preferences (Sub-game 1), one government (say that of country A) can
have Beveridgean preferences while the other has a Bismarckian objective (Sub-game2).
Finally, they can both have Bismarckian preferences (Sub-game3). For each type of
preferences they may choose to implement either a Beveridgean insurance system or a
Bismarckian one.
Our results suggest that when both governments have identical preferences, they
choose the social insurance system associated with their type. A more interesting
and surprising outcome emerges in the asymmetric case where government A has Bev-
eridgean preferences and government B Bismarckian ones. In this case the Nash equilib-
rium implies that both players choose a Beveridgean insurance policy. Table 4 presents
the detailed results for this case. It shows that government B nds it optimal to adopt
a Beveridgean insurance policy with a low tax (of 11% as opposed to the 22% tax in
country A). In this way the best response of Planner A is to increase slightly the tax
since the threat of migration is not as strong as compared to the equilibrium one when
in competition with a Bismarckian policy. Of notice that also country A is better o¤.
<Table 3 about here>
<Table 4 about here>
7 Conclusion
We address the question of social insurance systems integration in a two-country setting
where countries choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively the tax to be charged.
We analyze three possibilities: both governments provide Bismark-type of insurance,
both governments provide Beveridge-type of insurance, and one government provides
a Beveridge-type of insurance and the other a Bismark one. We conclude that a Bis-
markian insurance policy is never a¤ected by migration but that the Beveridgean one
is. Moreover, our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom a¤ecting tax rates may be
more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck
competition but that still the Beveridgean country attains a higher welfare under the
Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. We also
considered the strategic choice of the type of the system and illustrated that, when in
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competition to Beveridgean governments, Bismarkian governments may nd it bene-
cially to adopt a Beveridgean policy.
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Figure 1 – Natives of country A and country B. 
 
 
Table 1 – Insurance of the poor 
 No Mobility  Mobility of the poor  Mobility of the rich 
Country A BEV BIS   BEV BIS BEV   BEV BIS BEV 
Country B       BEV BIS BIS   BEV BIS BIS 
tA 0.25 0.50   0.219 0.50 0.2224   0.208 0.50 0.2223 
tB       0.219 0.50 0.50   0.208 0.50 0.50 
xcL       0.500 0.50 0.74         
xcH               0.50 0.50 0.37 
                      
SWFAL 0.36 0.13   0.336 0.13 0.26   0.327 0.13 0.28 
SWFAH 0.58 0.88   0.598 0.88 0.60   0.605 0.88 0.61 
SWFA 0.94 1.00   0.934 1.00 0.86   0.932 1.00 0.89 
SWFBL       0.336 0.13 0.14   0.327 0.13 0.13 
SWFBH       0.598 0.88 0.88   0.605 0.88 0.88 
SWFB       0.934 1.00 1.02   0.932 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Insurance for all. 
 No Mobility  Mobility of the poor  Mobility of the rich 
Country A BEV BIS   BEV BIS BEV   BEV BIS BEV 
Country B       BEV BIS BIS   BEV BIS BIS 
tA 0.500 0.500   0.500 0.500 0.500   0.500 0.500 0.445 
tB       0.500 0.500 0.500   0.500 0.500 0.500 
xcL       0.500 0.500 0.594         
xcH               0.500 0.500 0.417 
                      
SWFAL 0.130 0.125   0.130 0.125 0.123   0.130 0.125 0.119 
SWFAH 0.303 0.375   0.303 0.375 0.296   0.303 0.375 0.345 
SWFA 0.433 0.500   0.433 0.500 0.418   0.433 0.500 0.464 
SWFBL       0.130 0.125 0.126   0.130 0.125 0.125 
SWFBH       0.303 0.375 0.375   0.303 0.375 0.375 
SWFB       0.433 0.500 0.501   0.433 0.500 0.500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 1/2 
Natives country A Natives country B 
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Table 3 - Strategical choice of the type of system, given government's preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Beveridge Beveridge tax competition versus Beveridge Bismark tax competition when Government A has 
Beveridgean type of preferences and Government B has Bismarkian ones. Insurace of the poor, mobility of the poor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of policy BEV BIS BEV BIS
BEV 0.934; 0.934 0.860; 0.806 0.906; 1.019 0.860; 1.016
BIS 0.860; 0.806 0.750; 0.750 0.900; 0.103 0.750; 1.000
BEV 1.019; 0.906 0.103; 0.900 0.994; 0.994 0.961; 1.002
BIS 1.016; 0.860 1.000; 0.750 1.002; 0.961 1.000; 1.000
BEV
Government B
BIS
BEV
Government A
Type of preferences
BIS
Government A
Beveridgean BEV BEVGovernment B
Bismarkian 
preferences BEV BIS
t
A
0.225 0.222
t
B
0.110 0.500
xL 0.579 0.736
SWF
A
L 0.312 0.265
SWF
A
H 0.594 0.596
SWF
A
0.906 0.860
SWF
B
L 0.255 0.084
SWF
B
H 0.765 0.722
SWF
B
1.019 0.806
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